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Abstract
Drawing on extensive comparison with the United States, Japan and Britain, the pa-
per describes the “German model” of advanced capitalism as an institutionalized
high-wage economy combining high competitiveness in world markets with strong
social cohesion and, in particular, low levels of inequality along a variety of dimen-
sions. This combination is explained by a unique set of socio-economic institutions,
in particular socially instituted and circumscribed markets, negotiated firms commanding
long-term attachment of both labor and capital, a facilitating state relying mainly on
indirect means of intervention, widespread associational self-governance by organized
groups in civil society, and institutionalized cultural patterns that promote long-term
commitments and continuity. These institutions are shown to call forth and support a
particular pattern of production, sometimes referred to as diversified quality produc-
tion, that has in the 1970s and 1980s made possible both high wages and a low dis-
persion of wages and incomes.
In its second part, the paper proceeds to analyze in detail the performance problems of
an institutionalized high-wage economy of the German kind, and specifies a set of
conditions that must be met for such an economy to remain simultaneously competi-
tive and socially cohesive. The present crisis of the German “social market economy”
is discussed in terms of a coincidence of three factors: a possible secular exhaustion of
the model as such, the shock of unification, and the constraints imposed by growing
globalization of the capitalist economy on national economic governance.
Zusammenfassung
Auf der Grundlage eines Vergleichs mit den Vereinigten Staaten, Japan und Groß-
britannien wird das „deutsche Modell“ des entwickelten Kapitalismus als institutio-
nalisierte Hochlohnwirtschaft beschrieben, die hohe Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in interna-
tionalen Märkten mit starker sozialer Kohäsion und relativ geringer wirtschaftlicher
Ungleichheit verbindet. Diese Kombination wird als Resultat einer Reihe typischer
sozio-ökonomischer Institutionen erklärt, insbesondere sozial institutionalisierter und
umschriebener Märkte; durch Aushandlung regierter Unternehmen, deren Kapital und
Arbeit langfristig an sie gebunden sind; einen unterstützenden Staat, der sich vor-
nehmlich indirekter Interventionsformen bedient; weitverbreiteter verbandlicher
Selbstregulierung organisierter gesellschaftlicher Gruppen; und institutionalisierter
kultureller Muster, die langfristige Bindungen und Kontinuität fördern. Diese Institu-
tionen begründen und unterstützen eine bestimmte Art wirtschaftlicher Produktion,
die als diversifizierte Qualitätsproduktion bezeichnet worden ist und in den siebziger
und achtziger Jahren zugleich hohe Löhne und eine geringe Dispersion von Löhnen
und Einkommen ermöglicht hat.
In seinem zweiten Teil untersucht der Aufsatz die derzeitigen Bestandsprobleme einer
institutionalisierten Hochlohnökonomie der deutschen Art und nennt eine Reihe
von Bedingungen, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit eine solche Ökonomie zugleich
wettbewerbsfähig und sozial kohäsionsfähig bleiben kann. Die gegenwärtige Krise
der deutschen „sozialen Marktwirtschaft“ wird als Resultat des Zusammentreffens
dreier Faktoren dargestellt: einer möglichen säkularen Erschöpfung des Modells als
solchem, des Schocks der Wiedervereinigung, und der Rückwirkungen der zunehmen-
den Globalisierung der kapitalistischen Ökonomie auf nationale Formen wirtschaftli-
cher Steuerung.
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Does It Exist?
In the roughly four decades between the end of the Second World War and
German unification, West German society gave rise to a distinctive kind of
capitalist economy, governed by nationally specific social institutions that
made for high international competitiveness at high wages and, at the same
time, low inequality of incomes and living standards.1 Already by the late
1980s, when the differences in performance and social organization between
the West German economy and its main competitors came to be widely no-
ticed, the continued economic viability of the “German model” began to ap-
pear doubtful to many. Shortly thereafter, the survival of the German version
of advanced capitalism became tied to its successful extension to the former
East Germany. With the 1992 completion of the European Internal Market, it
became in addition dependent on the compatibility of German economic in-
stitutions with the emerging regime of the integrated European economy.
At the time of unification, West Germany was the internationally most suc-
cessful of the major economies (Table 1). More exposed to the world market
than both Japan and the U.S., the country accounted for a significantly larger
share in world visible exports than Japan, with roughly half its population,
and for about the same share as the United States, which has a population
twice the Japanese. West German trade and current account balances, ex-
pressed in percent of GDP, exceeded those of Japan, and presented a stark
contrast to the chronically deficitarian Anglo-American economies. This was
in spite of the fact that German wages had long been considerably higher
than Japanese and American wages.
Characteristically, the international success of the West German high-wage
economy was accompanied by comparatively little internal inequality. The
difference between high and average wages, as measured by the ratio of the
ninth over the fifth decile of the wage spread, was much lower in Germany
than in its major competitor countries. Similarly, German low wages, as rep-
resented by the first decile of the distribution, were significantly higher in
relation to the median (Table 2). Moreover, during the 1980s, at a time when
in all other industrialized countries the wage spread increased, the relation of
the high Germany wage to the median remained essentially unchanged,
whereas the low wage increased substantially, from 61 to 65 percent of the
median wage. Furthermore, intersectoral wage dispersion was dramatically
                                                  
1 I am indebted to Jonathan Zeitlin for critical comments. Most of the tables draw
on data assembled by Greg Jackson, under the auspices of joint work with Ronald
Dore.
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Table 1 The Comparative Performance of the German Economya
Trade
in Goods
and Services,
in % of GDPb
Visible Exports
in % of World
Total Exportsc
Trade (Current Account)
Balance in % of GDP
Hourly
Wage of
Workers,
US=100d
1988 1994 1988 1993 1988 1994 1992
Germany 54.9 51.0 12.0 10.1 6.5 (4.0) 2.7 (−1.1) 160 (119)
United
Kingdom 48.7 50.8 5.4 4.8 −4.5 (−3.1) −2.1 (−1.8)e   91 (82)
Japan 18.0 16.7 9.8 9.6 3.3 (2.8) 3.4 (3.1)e 100 (66)
United States 19.6 21.8 12.0 12.3 −2.6 (−2.6) −2.5 (−2.3) 100
a 1988: West Germany. 1994: United Germany.
b Trade data calculated on a balance of payments basis. Source: IMF, International Financial Statis-
tics Yearbook, 1994, and International Financial Statistics, June 1995.
c Exports calculated on an international transactions basis.
d In parentheses: In purchasing power equivalents. Source: Freeman (1994, 31), based on data
from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in
Manufacturing, 1992. German data refer to West Germany only.
e 1993.
Table 2 Wage Spread
D9:D5a D1:D5b
Early 1980s Early 1990s Early 1980s Early 1990s
Germany 1.63 1.64 0.61 0.65
United Kingdomc 1.72 1.99 0.68 0.59
Japanc 1.63 1.73 0.63 0.61
United States 2.16 2.22 0.45 0.40
Germany: Gross monthly earnings plus benefits (calculated as 1/12 of 13th and 14th month pay plus holi-
day allowances plus Christmas allowances) of full-time, full-year workers. Source: German Socio-
Economic Panel, Waves 1-8. Calculated by Viktor Steiner, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsfor-
schung, GmbH.
United Kingdom: Gross hourly earnings of persons paid on adult rates, whose pay for the survey week
was not affected by absence. Data prior to 1983 include men under 21 and women under 18. Source:
New Earnings Survey.
Japan: Monthly scheduled earnings of regular workers, 18–59 years old, at non-governmental establish-
ments with at least 5–10 workers (varies by survey year), excluding agriculture, forestry and fisheries,
private household services and employees of foreign governments. Source: Basic Survey of the
Wage Structure. Taken from Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1992).
United States: Gross hourly earnings, computed as annual earnings divided by annual hours worked (an-
nual weeks worked multiplied by usual weekly hours) of wage and salary workers. Source: Current
Population Survey.
a Ninth over fifth decile. Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1993.
b First over fifth decile. Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1993.
c Males only.
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low in West Germany compared to both Japan and the U.S., and so were the
earnings differentials between workers in small and large firms (Table 3). In
the latter respect, it is important to note that the employment share of small
and medium-sized firms in West Germany was far higher than in Britain and
the U.S., and close to Japan in spite of a comparatively low wage differential.
Finally, the ratio of German chief executive salaries over skilled wages, while
higher than in Japan, was lower than in Britain and, in particular, the U.S.
The Economic Institutions of Postwar German Capitalism
The West German combination of external competitiveness and normalized
high-wage employment reflects the operation of a distinctive set of socio-
economic institutions. These, in turn, reflect a complex historical compromise
between liberal capitalism, as introduced after the Second World War, and
Table 3 Other Indicators of Inequality
Intersectoral
Wage Dispersion
Average Earnings
of Workers in
Small Enterprises,
in Percent of Earnings
Ratio of CEO Earn-
ings to Average
Earnings of Manual
Workers in
Freemanc ILO Datad of Workers in LargeEnterprisesa
Manufacturingb
Germany 17.7 14.9  (29) 90  (58) 10.2
United
Kingdom 21.0 20.0  (20) 80  (40) 15.5
Japan 26.7 24.1  (20) 77  (68) 7.8
United States 27.3 24.8  (24) 57  (35) 25.8
a Source: Loveman and Sengenberger (1990, 34). In parentheses: Employment in small manufac-
turing enterprises, in percent of total employment in manufacturing 1986/87. Small manufacturing
enterprises are those with less than 500 workers. Sources: Acs and Audretsch (1993, 228); Sta-
tistics Bureau of Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual report on the Labour
Force Survey.
b Source on CEO earnings: The Wyatt Company. German and British data relate to large compa-
nies in all industries; Japanese data, to companies of all sizes in all industries; U.S. data, to
manufacturing firms of all sizes. To increase comparability, earnings are calculated as average
earnings in the upper quartile of CEO earnings. Average earnings of workers: various national
sources.
c Freeman (1988) uses several indicators of inter-industry wage dispersion, calculated on different
data as the variance of the logarithm of earnings by industry, multiplied by 100. The figures in the
table represent the average of the three most recent indicators that include all four countries. The
indicators are based on UN data from 1983, ILO data from 1984, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics data from 1986.
d Coefficient of variation of average wages and salaries of full-time workers at adult rates of pay
between ISIC categories (industries). Source: ILO Yearbook, own calculations. In brackets the
number of sectors over which the coefficient was calculated. Fewer categories are likely to under-
estimate the coefficient.
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two different countervailing forces, Social Democracy and Christian Democ-
racy – as well as between traditionalism and two alternative versions of mod-
ernism, liberalism and socialism, and of course between capital and labor.
This compromise was struck, and became firmly institutionalized, at a time
when both the Communist wing of the labor movement and the authoritarian
faction of the German business class were, for different reasons, excluded
from political participation.
Under these circumstances, those who wanted to turn the new Germany into
a liberal market economy had to accept the revival of a variety of traditional-
ist status protections – for farmers, civil servants, Mittelstand and the like – as
well as an extensive welfare state and established labor unions. At the same
time, the old middle classes, represented especially by the Christian Demo-
cratic Party, while successfully defending some of their protective institutions
– like the special status of artisanal firms – had to learn to use these under the
competition regime of a market economy and in the presence of a safely en-
trenched union movement. Labor, finally, was never strong enough, like in
Sweden, to rid society in the name of progress of, for example, small firms,
apprenticeship or works councils. Indeed German unions were rebuilt after
the war as Einheitsgewerkschaften, uniting previously divided socialist and
Catholic movements, which contributed to the recognition by labor of the
need to seek productive coexistence with non-socialist, traditional forms of
social organization, as well as class compromise at the workplace and be-
yond.
While the result of all this was certainly a capitalist market economy, it was
one that was and remains richly organized and densely regulated by a vast
variety of institutions that have sprung from sometimes incompatible
sources, from Mittelstand traditionalism to various ideological stripes of or-
ganized labor. While this makes Germany different from the United States, it
also distinguishes it from Sweden, in that Germany never became a Social-
Democratic society. Although workers and unions were able gradually to
build a strong position for themselves in German capitalism, stronger than in
all other large capitalist countries, the German political economy continued to
allow for decentralized compromise and local commitments supplementing,
underpinning and sometimes superseding the high politics of class accom-
modation at national level. On the other hand, although its political economy
is highly institutionally coordinated, and regardless of many other, often
striking parallels, Germany differs also from Japan, in that the institutions
that embed its economy and shape its performance are politically negotiated
and typically legally constitutionalized, rather than commanding compliance
as a matter of informal obligation or as a result of successful conservative so-
cial engineering in a closed national or “enterprise community.”
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Compared to the other major capitalist economies, the institutional frame-
work of the German economy can be summarily described as follows2:
1. Markets are politically instituted and socially regulated, and regarded as
creations of public policy deployed to serve public purposes. The postwar
competition regime is strict, resulting in comparatively low industrial con-
centration in most sectors. At the same time, wide areas of social life, like
health care, education and social insurance, are not governed by market prin-
ciples, and some markets, like those for labor and capital, are less so than oth-
ers. Competitive markets coexist with an extensive social welfare state, and
political intervention and social regulation often interfere with the distribu-
tive outcome of markets, for example by building a floor under them. Also,
small firms are in various ways shielded from the competition of large in-
dustry, or are publicly assisted in competing with it. Reflecting a history of
fragmented markets offering little space for mass production, price competi-
tion is often mitigated by product specialization.
2. Firms are social institutions, not just networks of private contracts or the
property of their shareholders. Their internal order is a matter of public inter-
est and is subject to extensive social regulation, by law and industrial agree-
ment. Also, managers of large German firms face capital and labor markets
that are highly organized, enabling both capital and labor to participate di-
rectly in the everyday operation of the firm and requiring decisions to be
continuously negotiated. Decisions thus take longer, but are also easier to
implement once taken.
German capital markets are not “markets for control.” Many companies con-
tinue to be privately held; only a small part of the productive capital is traded
at the stock exchange; banks may hold equity; shareholding is highly con-
centrated; and shares and companies do not often change hands. Firms fi-
nance themselves less through equity than through long-term bank credit.
Since banks can cast proxy votes on behalf of shares they hold in deposit,
they can effectively monitor management performance, which allows them to
give firms long-term loans and creates an incentive for them not to speculate
with stock. Labor is similarly present within firms, with workforces exercis-
ing legal rights to co-determination through works councils and, where ap-
plicable, supervisory board representation. Together with collective bargain-
ing and legal regulation, co-determination supports an employment regime
that makes it difficult for employers to dismiss workers, resulting in em-
                                                  
2 The following stylized account draws on the typology developed in
Hollingsworth et al. (1994).
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ployment spells almost as long as in Japan, and much longer than in the U.S.
(Table 4). Turning labor into a more fixed production factor and making it
more similar to capital than in market-driven employment, this encourages
high employer investment in skills.
3. The postwar German state is neither laissez-faire nor etatiste, and is best
described as an enabling state. Its capacity for direct intervention in the econ-
omy is curtailed by vertically and horizontally fragmented sovereignty, and
by robust constitutional limitations on discretionary government action. Ver-
tical fragmentation between the federal government and the Länder closely
limits what political majorities at national level can do, making political
change slow and policies less than immediately responsive to electoral ma-
jorities. The electoral system, which favors coalition governments, further
adds to the centrist drift and the long response time of German politics.
Horizontally, sovereignty is divided between the federal government and a
number of independent authorities insulated from electoral pressure, like the
Bundesbank or the Federal Cartel Office. Policy objectives like monetary sta-
bility and competitive markets are in this way removed from government
discretion and depoliticized. A similar effect is caused by strong constitu-
tional protections, like the right of unions and employers associations to
regulate wages and working conditions without government interference.
The result is both immobility and predictability of government policies, pre-
cluding rapid political innovation and allowing economic agents to develop
stable expectations, pursue long-term objectives, and build lasting relations
with one another.
Constitutionally dedicated to competitive markets and a hard currency, the
postwar German state lacks capacity for a selective industrial policy. In com-
Table 4 Employment Stability
Median Tenure in Present Job,
in Years
Average Tenure in Present Job,
in Years
Germany (1990)a 7.5 10.4
United Kingdom (1991) 4.4 7.9
Japan (1990)b 8.2 10.9
United States (1991) 3.0 6.7
a 1990. Excluding apprentices.
b Regular employees (persons hired for an indefinite period); temporary workers hired for more than
one month; daily workers hired for over 17 days, in private establishments with over 9 employees.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1993.
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pensation, it offers firms and industries a wide range of general infrastruc-
tural supports, like high public spending on research and development.
Moreover, to safeguard social cohesion, the federal government spends a
considerable share of the Gross Domestic Product on social protection. It also
accepts a constitutional obligation to provide for “equal living conditions” in
all Länder, which has given rise to an extensive, redistributive system of reve-
nue sharing. To expand its capacities in line with its responsibilities, the
German state has developed an extraordinary ability to assist groups in civil
society in organizing themselves, devolving on them governance functions
that would otherwise have to be either performed by the state or left to the
market. It is through state-enabled collective action and quasi-public, “corpo-
ratist” group self-government that the German political economy generates
most of the regulations and collective goods that circumscribe, correct and
underpin the instituted markets of soziale Marktwirtschaft.
4. Widespread organized cooperation among competitors and bargaining
between organized groups, conducted through publicly enabled associations,
is probably the most distinctive feature of the German political economy.
Governance is delegated either to individual associations or to collective ne-
gotiations between them, with the state often awarding its outcome legally
binding status. Associations performing quasi-public functions are typically
granted some form of obligatory and quasi-obligatory membership, helping
them overcome the free-rider problems associated with collective goods pro-
duction and giving Germany the most densely organized civil society among
the larger countries.
Publicly enabled associations regulate instituted markets in a variety of ways.
German business associations, prevented by law from operating as cartels,
turn price into quality competition, by promoting product specialization and
setting and enforcing high quality standards. To the same effect, employers
associations prevent low-wage competition by negotiating uniformly high
labor standards with national industrial unions. To make the outcome eco-
nomically viable, “dual” training, with associatively organized cooperation
between competing firms, between government and industry, and between
business and labor procures the skill base firms need to be competitive in
quality markets. For the same purpose, associations also organize cooperative
research and technology transfer. Legally enabled associational support is es-
pecially vital for small and medium-sized firms.
Above all, associative regulation constitutes the single most important source
of egalitarianism in the German economy. Joint governance of labor markets
by employers associations and centralized industrial unions is so firmly es-
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tablished that by the 1980s Germany had become the only major economy in
which the “postwar settlement” between capital and labor remained intact
(Table 5). Although unionism has been comparatively stable, associative labor
market governance in Germany is above all accomplished through near-
universal collective bargaining coverage, due to strongly institutionalized in-
dustry-wide negotiations and legal extension of agreements. More than any-
thing else, it is the German system of centralized and interconnected collec-
tive bargaining that is responsible for the low dispersion of wages in Ger-
many between individuals, industrial sectors, and small and large firms.
Table 5 Unions and Collective Bargaining
Union Densitya Collective
Bargaining
Coverageb
Variation in
Coverage
Rates by
Industries
1980 1985 1988 1990 1980 1990 1990
c
Germany 37.0 37.4 33.8     32.9d      82      82e 0.14
United
Kingdom 50.7 45.5 41.5     39.1      70f      47 0.34
Japan 31.1 28.9 26.8     25.4      28      21g 0.74
United States 23.0 18.0 16.4     15.6      26      18 0.61
a Employed members only. Sources: 1980, 1985, 1988: Visser (1991). 1990: OECD Employment
Outlook, 1994.
b OEDC Employment Outlook, 1994. The German figures are estimates supplied by the WSI, a re-
search institute of the German Trade Union Confederaton (DGB). The Bundesarbeitsministerium
(Federal Ministry of Labor) reports a coverage rate of 90 and 91 percent for the two years; the
OECD source uses the government data.
c Coefficient of variation. Source: see b.
d West Germany.       e   West Germany.       f   1978.      g   1989.
5. German economic culture is often traditionalist. Savings rates are high,
and consumer credit, although increasing, remains low by comparison. Price
competition is mitigated by socially established preferences for quality. Mar-
kets do not per se confer merit: social status and solidarity interfere, and secu-
rity is regarded as important. Speculation is not valued. Continuous moni-
toring of one’s short-term balance of economic advantage is not a social norm,
encouraging long-term orientations and commitments and supporting,
among other things, a redistributive tax system. Professional competence is
highly regarded for its own sake; German managers tend to be engineers, and
authority at the workplace is based on superior technical knowledge. Collec-
tivism and discipline have given way as core cultural values to privacy and
autonomy from organizational control and market pressure, as evidenced by
strong cultural support for short working hours, low participation in paid
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employment, and a qualification-based organization of work. Work-related
knowledge is vested in an occupational qualification structure, where the
distinction between knowledge and skills is conceived as gradual rather than
categoric. Institutionally, this is reflected in the unique vocational training
system, with its long socialization periods leading to portable certificates un-
der national regulations negotiated between unions and employers associa-
tions.3
Institutional Structure and Economic Performance
In the 1970s and 1980s, the institutional structure of the West German econ-
omy conditioned and sustained a distinctive pattern of performance that
happened to be highly competitive in world markets. High costs originating
in socially circumscribed labor markets ruled out price-competitive produc-
tion throughout the economy and forced firms to seek survival in quality-
competitive international markets. Here, the same set of German institutions that
constituted a prohibitive liability in price-competitive markets served as a competitive
asset – with what would be debilitating rigidities for firms trying to compete on
price, offering enabling flexibilities to firms pursuing quality-competitiveness
through upgrading and customization of products4.
While imposing constraints that make low-cost production prohibitively
costly, German economic institutions offer firms rich opportunities for strategic
upgrading. An extended social welfare state, negotiated management under
                                                  
3 Nothing in the above is to suggest that the institutional configuration that made
up the “German system” in the 1970s and 1980s was created in one piece, or cre-
ated for the economic purposes that it came to serve. Some of its elements were
pre-Wilhelminian, others were introduced by the Allies after 1945, and still others
originated in the politics of the Federal Republic, sometimes drawing on and
modifying older arrangements, and sometimes not. Moreover, each element, for
example the banking system, was subject to its own historical dynamic. All were
and continue to be changing, for their own reasons as well as in reaction to each
other, and certainly there can be no presumption of a preestablished fit between
them, even though one might want to allow for some reinforcement effects of the
“model’s”, historically contingent, social and economic success. That its parts
happened to perform together so well during the period in question must be at-
tributed at least as much to fortuna as to virtu.
4 For more detail see my essay on “diversified quality production” (Streeck 1992).
Quality competition can be described as the pursuit of monopoly rents through
product diversification. The latter can, within limits, expand quality-competitive
markets by breaking up existing mass markets. Within quality markets, price
competition is suspended as long as the price differential to less customized, sub-
stitute products is not excessive.
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co-determination, and encompassing collective bargaining place the economy
under social pressures that prevent anything beyond moderate differentiation
of wages and working conditions. Unions and business associations, then,
find it in their common interest to deploy their quasi-public powers to help
the economy move into quality-competitive markets, through cooperative
upgrading of skills, work organization, technology and products. Just as the
universality of the pressure accounts for the fact that only very few German
products have remained price-competitive, the general availability of coop-
erative supports, also generated by encompassing labor-inclusive associative
governance under state facilitation, explains the high general competitiveness
and low sectoral specialization of the German manufacturing sector. How
successful this system has been is indicated by the fact that before unification,
that sector was proportionately larger than in any comparable country, in
spite of its having to pay much higher wages. It also was and still is interna-
tionally competitive across a uniquely wide range of products, making Ger-
many by far the world’s most diversified export economy.
German industrial upgrading is typically slow and gradual but also continu-
ous, reflecting an institutional infrastructure that makes for long decision
times while fostering long-term orientations. The resulting pattern of innova-
tion is one that is more likely to generate improvements of existing products
of existing firms and sectors than to give rise to new sectors. Generally, sticky
decisions, steady commitments and delayed responses in German institutions
make for slow fluctuations, up or down, in economic activity and perform-
ance; for flat cyclical movements, especially compared to the United States;
and for low dispersion of outcomes, all of which are conducive to stable co-
operation and steady improvement across the board. Averages are typically
high, coefficients of variation low, and extreme cases are rare at both ends.
The broad movement of the German economy in the 1970s and 1980s into
quality-competitive markets was helped by the traditional preference of
German consumers for quality. Traditionalism contributed also to a high
savings rate, which helped generate the patient capital needed for continuous
upgrading of products and production factors. Within firms, sticky capital
and committed labor, having access to voice as an alternative to exit, enabled
managements to take the long view, based on stable bargains with and be-
tween both. In politics, divided and immobile economic government en-
shrined a currency regime that foreclosed devaluation to restore price-
competitiveness, and offered investors insurance against electoral volatility.
Above all, the success of the “German model,” as long as it lasted, derived
from the way in which it utilized social pressures for an egalitarian distribu-
tion of economic outcomes to generate an egalitarian distribution of produc-
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tive capabilities, with the latter in turn enabling the economy to underwrite the
former. Complementing social constraints on some economic strategies with
productive opportunities for others, and thereby creating a pattern of pro-
duction capable of sustaining a socially desirable but economically improb-
able pattern of distribution, the system managed to combine competitive effi-
ciency with high economic equality and social cohesion.
Three Conditions of Success: A Socio-Economic Tightrope Walk
Competitive success of an institutionalized high-wage economy like Ger-
many’s is inevitably precarious and fragile, as it must simultaneously ac-
commodate international markets and domestic pressures for equality and
social cohesion. Three highly elusive conditions must be met for this to be
possible:
1. Worldwide product markets for quality-competitive goods must be large
enough to sustain full employment in an economy that has barred itself from
serving price-competitive markets. The volume of demand that a quality-
competitive economy can attract depends on the historical evolution of global
demand generally, the competitive capabilities of other economies, successful
domestic product innovation expanding quality-competitive markets at the
expense of price-competitive ones, and domestic production costs not ex-
ceeding the point where the price differential between quality-competitive
and price-competitive goods becomes too large for too many customers.
2. Product innovation must proceed fast enough to give the economy a sus-
tained edge in the quality-competitive markets in which it competes. This re-
quires continuous high investment in research and development. Product
leadership also depends on a country’s culturally rooted pattern of knowl-
edge production and diffusion, as well as of management, technology use,
work organization and skill formation continuing to match changing markets
and technologies.
3. The economy’s labor supply must fit the volume and character of demand
in quality markets, providing the skills needed to serve such markets and al-
lowing for a satisfactory level of employment in high-skill and high-wage
jobs. The latter requires that no more than a few among a country’s workforce
be unable to function in high-skill jobs. Only if their numbers are small can
they be taken out of the labor market and sustained by a welfare state funded
from the rich proceeds of high quality-competitiveness. Employment for the
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others must be made possible by a labor market policy – public, private or
both – that upgrades their skills to a level where they can earn the high wages
mandated for them by collective bargaining and social citizenship. Moreover,
to the extent that markets for high-quality products cannot be indefinitely ex-
panded by accelerated product innovation, demand-side employment con-
straints must be accommodated by cutting the labor supply, through reduc-
ing working time or retiring part of the workforce, to allow for an equitable
distribution of the available high-wage employment among the vast majority.
Socially acceptable redistribution of employment is possible only as long as
quality-competitive product markets are large enough for institutionally
mandated underemployment to be small enough to be welcomed as leisure.
If underemployment incurred in defense of normalized high-wage employ-
ment exceeds the very low level that alone can be socially acceptable, thereby
turning into unemployment – be it because international quality markets
have become crowded; the rate of innovation in the domestic economy has
slowed down in comparison to relevant competitors; labor market policy has
failed, for whatever reason, to upgrade skills or retire capacity efficiently and
equitably; or wage moderation, containment of social spending and process
innovation fail to compensate for limited product advantage or the failures of
labor market policy – the costs of social support for those outside the labor
market must soar, further depressing the economy’s international competi-
tiveness, and high equality among the employed is bound to be increasingly
overshadowed by deep inequality between the employed and a large number
of long-term unemployed.
At this point, social institutions that rule out low-wage employment in order
to generate high-wage employment become increasingly likely to be overrid-
den by market forces. As the labor constraint that drives industrial strategy in
an instituted high-wage economy is weakened, with low-wage employment
becoming an option for profit-seeking employers and work-seeking workers,
its virtuous supply-side effect wanes, eventually resulting in even less high-
wage and high-skill employment than there might have been without de-
regulation. In the ensuing spiral of institutional erosion and structural down-
grading, the difference in governance and performance between an instituted
high-wage and a liberal market economy disappears.
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Can It Survive?
In 1993 the German economy moved into its worst recession in postwar his-
tory, raising the possibility that the German economic Sonderweg might finally
have ended. In the following I will distinguish three sources of the present
malaise of German capitalism: (1) a possible secular exhaustion of its capacity to
perform the complicated balancing acts required for its success; (2) the strains
caused by the shock of unification; and (3) the changing conditions in the global
economy of which Germany is part. My argument will be that while in normal
circumstances the “German model” may or may not once again have found a
way out of its difficulties, unification may have so much exacerbated these as
to make them unsurmountable. Moreover, even if East Germany could
against the odds be incorporated in United Germany on West German terms,
the simultaneous incorporation of Germany as a whole in a globalized world
economy exposes German economic institutions to new kinds of pressure
that they may be unable to withstand.
The Model Exhausted?
If there was one blemish on West German economic performance in the
1980s, this was persistent high unemployment. To be sure, unemployment in
the much more market-driven economy of the United Kingdom was even
higher throughout the period (Table 6). But in Germany, with its institution-
alized commitment to social cohesion and its deployment of labor constraint
as a supply-side stimulus, it posed more fundamental problems. This ex-
plains why German unions in the 1980s used their political and industrial
clout to redistribute employment by reducing working time (Table 7) – fore-
going economic growth by cutting labor input (Table 8), and trading potential
increases in money income for leisure, in an effort to defend high equality.
They also tried to win employers and government for a nationwide “training
offensive,” aimed at raising worker skills to a level where ideally everybody
could be employed at high wages in a flat wage structure, so as to avoid the
need to restore full employment by wage cuts, broader wage dispersion, and a prolif-
eration of low-wage and low-skill jobs.
This strategy was not entirely ineffective. By the end of the 1980s, unem-
ployment was beginning to decline, and overall employment and workforce
participation had slightly increased. Still, a sizable number of unemployed,
almost half of them long-term, remained. Depending on the perspective, this
could be blamed on the institutional rigidities of German labor markets, or al-
ternatively on lack of effort in labor market policy and working time reduction.
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Table 6 Employment and Unemployment
Average Unemployment Ratea Long-Term Unemploymentb
1981–85 1986–90 1991–94 1990 1993
Germany          6.4 5.8         5.4c        46.3        40.3d
United Kingdom        11.3 8.8         9.7        36.0        42.5
Japan          2.5 2.5         2.4        19.1        17.2
United States          8.2 5.8         6.7          5.6        11.7
a OECD standardized unemployment rates, defined as the number of persons unemployed as a per-
centage of the total labor force (including the self-employed and the armed forces). Unemployed
persons are persons aged 15 and over who (1) are without work, (2) are available to start work
within the next two weeks, and (3) have actively sought employment at some time during the previ-
ous four weeks (definition adopted from ILO and used by both EUROSTAT and OECD to calculate
standardized rates). OECD Employment Outlook, various issues.
b From survey-based data. Long-term unemployment is defined as the percentage of the unemployed
that have been out of employment for 12 months or more. Source: OECD Employment Outlook,
1992 and 1995.
c West Germany only. According to EUROSTAT, the rate for united Germany was 7.1 percent.
d Data refer to united Germany.
Table 7 Working Time
Average Hours Worked Per Person and Yeara
1973 1983 1993
Germany 1,804 1,668            1,534b
Japan 2,185 2,095            1,965c
United States 1,831 1,754            1,743
a Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1993. Data includes part-time work. Germany and U.S.:
dependent employment only; Japan: total employment.
b West Germany only. No data for united Germany available.
c 1992.
Table 8 Labor Input
Labor Force Participation
Total (Females)a
Average Yearly Rate of
Change in Employment,
1983-1990b
Percent
Change in
Resident
Population
1979 1992 Males Females 1970-1988
c
Germany 68.3 (52.2) 69.8 (59.0) 0.9 1.7 0.8
United Kingdom 74.3 (58.0) 75.1 (64.5) 1.2 2.9 2.6
Japan 71.8 (54.7) 75.5 (61.7) 1.0 1.6 18.6
United States 72.1 (58.8) 76.9 (68.9) 1.7 2.8 20.1
a Total labor force, divided by the population of working age (15-64) at mid-year. Source: OECD Em-
ployment Outlook, July 1993.
b Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1993
c Source:The Economist Book of Vital Statistics, 1990, p. 18.
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It could also be attributed to costs, of labor or the welfare state, having crossed
the threshold beyond which they begin to count again even in quality mar-
kets. But it could as well have been due to deficient product innovation failing to
keep the economy quality-competitive in spite of and together with its insti-
tutional rigidities and high social costs. As high unemployment became in-
creasingly entrenched, the question for those trying to save the system be-
came whether there were possibilities for speeding up innovation and im-
proving labor market, training and working time policies that, if inevitable
together with some negotiated cost-cutting, could restore high-wage full em-
ployment, thereby preempting pressures for more markets, more managerial
prerogative, and a liberal Ordnungspolitik of deregulation. Conversely, argu-
ments for such changes came to be based on claims that improved product
innovation alone would not win back a sufficiently large market share; that
labor market, training and working time policies had reached their financial,
social or other limits; and that effective cost reduction was achievable only by
deregulation returning allocational decisions to “market forces”.
To many, the collapse of employment in the 1993 recession confirmed earlier
diagnoses of endemic weaknesses. Japanese advances in traditionally Ger-
man quality markets suggested that the era of undisputed German product
leadership had ended, and with it the capacity of German industry to evade
price competition. Also, growing pressures on German firms to cut costs con-
firmed suspicions that in times of assured product advantage, German man-
agements had neglected process innovation, especially the introduction of
“lean” production methods, not least in response to powerful works councils
defending jobs under endemic high unemployment. Mounting mass dismiss-
als and rapidly rising unemployment rates, not just in East but also in West
Germany, seemed to show that the possibilities for working time reduction
and early retirement had been exhausted. And the limitations of skill up-
grading as a means of full employment policy seemed to be indicated, among
other things, by a higher-than-ever number of young people dropping out of
the apprenticeship system, due apparently to its significantly raised intellec-
tual demands.
Perhaps most disturbing were concerns, also older than the crisis but drama-
tized by it, that the German system of knowledge production and diffusion
might have structurally and, barring major institutional adjustments, irre-
versibly lost touch with changing markets. With the Japanese successes of the
late 1980s, competitive advantage in quality markets appeared to derive in-
creasingly from fast product turnover rather than slow product refinement.
The German system of innovation, management and “organizational culture”
– with applied research conducted by research institutes and associations
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close to industrial users linking up with widely available shopfloor-generated
worker skills vested in long-term commitments to quasi-professional occu-
pational identities, and governed by consensus-building institutions like co-
determination – seemed far better suited to the former than to the latter, and
unlikely to be able to move from the one to the other on short notice.
Already before unification, German capitalism may thus have hit its limits
with respect to the size of its possible product markets, its capacity to main-
tain product leadership, its ability to manage its labor market, or more than
one of these at the same time. Indications were that in response, it had slowly
begun to deteriorate into a pattern where socially instituted markets, negoti-
ated management, structurally conservative politics, quasi-public associa-
tional governance and cultural traditionalism resulted no longer in industrial
upgrading, but in an ever-expanding number of people being relegated to an
ever more expensive and, ultimately, unsustainable social safety net in the
widest sense, being kept out of employment at public expense, or in em-
ployment at private expense.
Whether or not these tendencies could have been corrected in normal condi-
tions is a moot question. Experience suggests that prospects for consensual
cost-cutting were not entirely bleak. German collective bargaining, together
with the institutionalized monetarism of the Bundesbank, has always been
remarkably good at keeping unit labor costs under control, without deregu-
lation and indeed in order to prevent it (Streeck 1994). Unification, however,
and the boom and bust that followed it did nothing to resolve whatever
structural problems may have existed at the time. Instead it imparted an his-
torical shock to the “German model” that may well have been powerful
enough to throw it off course once and for all.
The Shock of Unification
The crisis of the early 1990s might have come even without unification, be-
cause of a secular exhaustion of the “German model”. But it could also have
been caused by unification alone, since rebuilding a country as large as East
Germany would have been demanding even on the strongest economy.
Sorting out the two explanations is further complicated by the possibility that
the inherent institutional logic of the (West) German political economy may
have forced it to define the problems of unification in a way that made them
even more difficult to resolve than they would otherwise have been.
The West German response to unification was above all designed to protect
the West German social order from being modified by the event. Unification
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was conceived and executed as a giant exercise in Institutionentransfer: a
wholesale transplantation of the entire array of West German institutions to
the former East Germany. This approach was supported by all major West
German players, including business, labor, the conservative government, and
the Social-Democratic opposition. With respect to the economy, unification
involved the immediate expansion to the East of socially circumscribed mar-
kets, negotiated firms, enabling state intervention and market-regulating as-
sociations. Immediately thereafter, national unions and employers associa-
tions formally committed themselves to raising East German wages to West
German levels within the next half decade, explicitly ruling out the estab-
lishment of a low-wage area in the East. In part this reflected a shared belief
that however low East German wages might be, German industry could
never be price-competitive. But there was clearly also a fear that a low-wage
regime in the East might erode the high-wage and high-skill regime in the
West by opening up opportunities for low-wage production that might lure
German firms away from the upgrading path of industrial virtue.
While its wages were being raised far beyond its productivity, East German
industry was included in the rigorous competition regime West German
firms had had four decades to learn to live with. Nobody can have been in
doubt that this was bound to place the East German economy under poten-
tially destructive adjustment pressures, with the likely outcome of prolonged
mass unemployment. This, in turn, inevitably triggered massive financial
transfers from West to East, given that among the institutions that had been
transplanted wholesale with unification was the West German welfare state.
While it has been argued that these risks were difficult to gauge at the time of
unification, it is questionable whether more realistic forecasts would have
made much of a difference. Bent on protecting West German institutions, all
relevant parties more or less consciously opted for a policy of trying to buy the
East German economy into the West German high-wage system, at whatever cost
to East German workers or West German taxpayers, in the hope that some-
how the price would be less than catastrophic.
That hope may well be disappointed. By the mid-1990s United Germany was
engaged in the largest wealth transfer in economic history, having committed
itself for at least a decade to subsidize the neue Länder at a level of about $100
billion a year, to cover all manner of expenses, from public infrastructural in-
vestment to pension supplements and, not least, unemployment benefit. Still,
there is no guaranteee that this extraordinary redistributive effort will not in
the end be self-defeating. Public debt has exploded since 1989, and may not
be reined in for a long time – or only by cuts in the welfare state or in research
and development effort that would in more than one way be obstructive of a
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quality-competitive “social market economy.” Also, world markets for Ger-
man products, hardly large enough to provide full employment for West
Germany and perhaps shrinking anyway for reasons of their own, may prove
too small for Germany as a whole; the training costs of continued industrial
upgrading, even if they might have been manageable for the West, may be
too high for West and East together, especially as the latter has to be subsi-
dized by the former; and the capacity of the West German economy for in-
dustrial innovation, perhaps already in decline, may not suffice to restore
competitiveness to West and East Germany at the same time.
Eastern unemployment and, compared to the Western part of the country,
regional impoverishment may thus become a lasting condition, owing in a
paradoxical sense to the excessively ambitious targets imposed on the neue
Länder as part and parcel of Institutionentransfer. At the same time, abiding
efforts to subsidize internal inequality down to a level compatible with insti-
tutional continuity may cause constant financial bleeding. Protracted eco-
nomic stagnation and declining competitiveness may then unleash market
forces strong enough to erode, gradually and a under growing risk of divisive
political conflict, the very same institutions, and make impossible the kind of
economic performance, that unification by Institutionentransfer was intended
to preserve.
The Challenge of Globalization
On the surface, it would seem hard to understand why a set of economic in-
stitutions as successful in world markets as the German one should be threat-
ened by further economic internationalization. But while the free trade re-
gime of the postwar period left national boundaries intact – although allow-
ing them to be crossed – globalization abolishes them. Competitive perform-
ance of German high-wage capitalism requires continuous supportive as well
as directive public or quasi-public intervention, inevitably organized at na-
tional level and dependent on a capacity, vested in the nation-state, to police
the boundaries between the national economy and its environment. While
versions of capitalism that require less state capacity for their governance
may hope that the attrition of national boundaries under globalization will
leave them intact, this is quite different for a nationally organized economy
like Germany.
The postwar German compromise between labor and capital, or between
German society and its capitalist economy, was conditional on limited mobil-
ity of production factors across national borders. At its core was an institu-
tionalized mutual accommodation of capital and labor markets – both them-
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selves highly organized by government intervention and associative self-
regulation – that turned less-than-perfectly mobile capital into a societal re-
source, and the financial sector into an economic infrastructure, for a pattern
of production compatible with social objectives like low inequality. In ex-
change, society provided a labor supply willing and able to satisfy economic
requirements of high competitiveness in international quality markets. Glob-
alization, by increasing the mobility of capital and labor across national bor-
ders, extricates the labor supply from national control and enables the finan-
cial sector to refuse doing service as a national utility. By internationalizing,
and thereby disorganizing, capital and labor markets, globalization dissolves
whatever negiotiated coordination may have been nationally accomplished
between them and replaces it with global hierarchical dominance of the for-
mer over the latter.
The West German labor market has long attracted foreign workers, so much so
that by the late 1980s the number of foreigners living in West Germany had
become far higher than in any other Western European country. Still, the
German mixture of immigration controls, effective enforcement of labor stan-
dards, full extension to immigrants of union representation and social rights
and partial integration of foreign workers in training and retraining kept the
supply of unskilled labor to domestic employers low enough to sustain labor
market pressures for upward restructuring. The breakdown of Communism
in Eastern Europe, however, has unleashed an inflow of immigrants of a di-
mension that in the long term seems incompatible with high labor standards,
an extended welfare state, and a normalized pattern of high-wage and high-
skill employment.
Unemployment in Eastern Europe will change German labor markets even
without direct immigration, much more so than the completion of the Euro-
pean Community’s “Internal Market” in 1992. It has always been part of the
German model that low-skill jobs were to be allowed to move to low-wage
countries, with job outflow ideally balanced by growth of, and training for,
high-skill and high-wage employment. High long-term unemployment in the
1980s showed that achieving this balance was becoming difficult even when
the Iron Curtain was still in place. Today the Czech Republic in particular has
become a vast low-wage labor pool for German firms – and, unlike classical
low-wage countries like Portugal, one with a skilled workforce geographi-
cally close enough to Germany even to be included in just-in-time produc-
tion.
Accession of Eastern Europe to the European Union, which Germany cannot
resist because it must be vitally interested in political stability behind its East-
ern borders, will remove the last remaining uncertainties for Western inves-
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tors, most of whom will be German. It will also make construction of a “Social
Dimension” of the European Internal Market, one that might protect German
labor markets from the deregulating effects of internationalization, even more
difficult than it already is. The consequence will be a further increase in the
availability to German employers of cheap, and sometimes not even un-
skilled, labor, undermining the German high-wage system by encouraging
outflow of jobs at a time of growing inflow of workers.
As the German labor market is dissolving into its international environment,
so is the German capital market. Financial capital was always more interna-
tionally mobile than labor, and West Germany was one of the first countries
after the war formally to dispense with capital controls. But for a long time
there were a number of effective impediments to capital mobility sufficient to
allow for a meaningful distinction between German and non-German capital,
and for the former to be governed by national institutions. For reasons related
to national history and international politics, German finance capital was
historically less cosmopolitan in outlook and enjoyed less international mar-
ket access than British capital. Also, German banks’ Hausbank mode of opera-
tion was and is hard to apply outside Germany; different national regulatory
regimes made international operations costly to enter; and communication
technology before the micro-electronic revolution slowed international capital
flows, thereby limiting the size of the international capital market. As to
German industrial capital, general logistical, organizational and political un-
certainties combined with cultural idiosyncrasies of management and work
organization – as well as with the specific incentives offered by Standort
Deutschland, such as high-skilled labor and social peace – to keep the outflow
of investment and jobs limited.
Globalization has removed most of these constraints and turned formal into
de facto liberalization of capital markets. Financial internationalization weak-
ens the hold German banks have over the credit supply to German firms,
which in turn weakens the banks’ capacity and motivation to monitor com-
pany performance and promote prudent long-termism in company strategy.
Large German firms seem to have for some time been making efforts to extri-
cate themselves from the tutelage of their Hausbanken, in part because with
globalization their credit needs are beginning to outgrow the German market.
Simultaneously, attracted by burgeoning international opportunities, the
German financial sector is becoming more internationally minded, with even
Sparkassen and Genossenschaftsbanken taking a keen interest in the global ca-
sino. As national boundaries wither away, and the German financial sector
dissolves into a globally integrated financial services industry, the special re-
lationship between German banks and German firms may increasingly be-
come less “relational” and more market-like.
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The Parochialism of Nationally Organized Capitalism
If national boundaries are doomed to fall in the course of globalization,
making it impossible for nationally distinct versions of capitalism to remain
distinct from their environment, could the German model not survive by be-
ing extended to the emerging global economy? Indeed as the capitalist econ-
omy internationalizes, some of the institutions that govern its German ver-
sion are being adopted by other countries and international organizations.
Unlike the Institutionentransfer of German unification, however, this process is
highly selective, being strictly limited to institutions that make or accommo-
date markets at the exclusion of others, equally central to German capitalism,
that socially embed and correct such markets.
1. International markets are constructed through diplomacy, not through the
complex domestic class politics that gave rise to soziale Marktwirtschaft. They
are therefore not likely ever to become embedded in similar protective-
redistributive arrangements as German markets. Nota bene that Germany, in
coalition with the British and against the French, succeeded in extending its
competition regime to the European Community, whereas its efforts to en-
dow the Internal Market with a “social dimension,” in alliance with the
French and against the British, came to naught.
2. The German firm cannot serve as a model for corporate reorganization in
other countries. Co-determination is not based in the individual firm and its
competitive interests, but in the broader German political and institutional
context. It cannot therefore be internationally extended. This holds even
within the European Community, where efforts to export German company
law, and with it the characteristic balance between capital and labor in the
governance of large firms, were defeated by resistance not just from Euro-
pean capital, but also from most non-German trade unions. Moreover, Ger-
man management practices, unlike Japanese ones, have never been success-
fully reproduced outside Germany, reflecting the dependence of German
firms for crucial governance functions on a – national – exoskeleton of rule-
setting institutions that an individual firm cannot and will not build on its
own.
3. Even more than in Germany, what state capacity there is in the interna-
tional economy is weak and fragmented. International efforts to mobilize
state-like forms of public power for purposes of economic governance never
got very far, not even in the European Community, which historically repre-
sents the most ambitious attempt at state-building above the nation-state. If
monetary union is ever realized, the European Central Bank will be as insu-
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lated from political pressure as the German Bundesbank, and will operate
under the same monetarist principles. Unlike the German state, however, the
European quasi-state has no capacity to provide for equalization of living
conditions in its territorial subunits. Even more importantly, the German
state’s quintessential ability to replace direct state intervention and provision
with assistance to organized social groups regulating themselves in the pur-
suit of collective goods – such as the infrastructural conditions of interna-
tional competitiveness under high labor standards and a hard currency re-
gime – cannot be replicated at the international level. Just as German
Marktwirtschaft is being internationalized without its social correctives, Ger-
man institutionalized monetarism is about to be transferred to the European
Community without the associative self-governance that makes it sozialver-
träglich in Germany.
4. German associations prosper because of their close relationship to a fa-
cilitating state. No such state exists, nor can one exist, in the international
economy. To the extent that the latter is a negotiated economy, it is negotiated
between states, not between associations. Beyond the nation-state there are no
organized social groups with the capacity to build and maintain a floor under
international markets, or correct international market outcomes by negotiated
redistribution. Other than states, the only major actors in the international
arena are large firms, increasingly institutional in character, with ample re-
sources to pursue their interests individually, unconstrained by union or
government pressure forcing them into international class solidarity, and in-
deed with a growing capacity to extricate themselves from associative gov-
ernance at national level, very likely increasingly also in Germany.
5. German traditionalist culture would seem to be even less suitable for in-
ternationalization. As Michel Albert (1993) has pointed out, Germans are as
susceptible as anybody else to the attractions of non-traditional, “American”
economic culture. Compared to these, the slow-moving, conservative, collec-
tivistic and all-too-prudent German system must inevitably seem boring and
utterly devoid of “fun.” In fact there are many ways in which cultural inter-
nationalization may disrupt the standard operating procedures of a densely
organized society like Germany that thrives on long-term incremental im-
provement and requires stable commitments and suppression of opportun-
ism. Just as German savers and investors may grow more rechenhaft, German
managers, increasingly trained at American business schools, may want to be
allowed to “make decisions” like their American role models. And there are
indications that the German vocational training system is about to be dra-
matically transformed by internationalization, among other things by Euro-
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pean Community “harmonization” of skill profiles in the unified European
labor market.
Market-modifying and market-correcting political intervention in the econ-
omy, including publicly enabled associational self-regulation, can take place
only within nation-states, because it is only here that the public power neces-
sary for the purpose can be mobilized. Economic globalization therefore
erodes the conditions for such intervention and, by default but also by de-
sign, leaves only de-politicized, privatized and market-driven forms of eco-
nomic order. It is above all for this reason that the German version of capital-
ism cannot be exported. Globalization discriminates against modes of eco-
nomic governance that require public intervention associated with a sort of
state capacity that is unavailable in the anarchic world of international poli-
tics. It favors national systems like those of the United States and Britain that
have historically relied less on public-political and more on private-
contractual economic governance, making them more structurally compatible
with the emerging global system, and in fact enabling them to regard the lat-
ter as an extension of themselves. It is this deregulatory bias of globalization
that seems to be at the bottom of Albert’s (1993) pessimistic prediction that
global competition will result in the perverse outcome of the less well-
performing Anglo-American model of capitalism outcompeting the better
performing “Rhine model.”
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